State-dependent pricing (SDP) models treat the timing of price changes as a pro…t-maximizing choice, symmetrically with other decisions of …rms. Using quantitative general equilibrium models which incorporate a "generalized (S,s) approach", we investigate the implications of SDP for topics in two major areas of macroeconomic research, the early 1990s SDP literature and more recent work on persistence mechanisms. First, we show that state-dependent pricing leads to unusual macroeconomic dynamics in response to monetary shocks, echoing earlier suggestions: these novel dynamics arise because of the timing of price adjustments chosen by …rms. In particular, we display an example in which output responses peak at about a year, while in ‡ation peaks at about two years after the shock. Second, we examine whether the persistence-enhancing e¤ects of two New Keynesian model features, namely speci…c factor markets and variable elasticity demand curves, depend importantly on whether pricing is state dependent. In an SDP setting, we provide examples in which speci…c factor markets perversely works to lower persistence, while variable elasticity demand raises it.
Introduction
State-dependent pricing models have long been viewed as a desirable vehicle for macroeconomic analysis, because these models treat the timing of price changes as a pro…t-maximizing choice. SDP models make it possible to explore how the frequency of price changes responds to variations in model features, such as the form of the monetary policy rule, and to develop the implications of altered adjustment timing for the evolution of other macroeconomic variables. 1 Yet, most macroeconomic investigations employ models with time dependent pricing (TDP) for two reasons. First, until recently, it has not been possible to construct operational SDP models, frameworks in which the e¤ects of alternative structural features could be explored or that could be readily taken to the data. By contrast, TDP models have proven to be a workhorse for both of these purposes. Second, macroeconomists have been unsure if incorporating state-dependent pricing behavior would make a signi…cant di¤erence for the implications of economic models: some have speculated that it would be relatively inconsequential in many contexts to adopt SDP rather than the more easily solved TDP model and others have expressed the view that incorporating state-dependence is unnecessary because the frequency of price changes do not vary enough, at least in moderate in ‡ations. 2 Using a battery of quantitative general equilibrium models developed along the lines of Dotsey, King and Wolman [1999] , we show that SDP modeling makes a difference in terms of model implications within two major areas of macroeconomic literature. First, as suggested by the 1990s SDP literature -which made use of very di¤erent models -we show that there can be a quantitatively important e¤ect of state-dependent pricing for economic outcomes under steady in ‡ation and in response to monetary shocks. State-dependent pricing leads to novel macroeconomic dynamics, including a change in the lead-lag structure of output and in ‡ation. In particular, we display an example in which output responses peak at about a year, while in ‡ation peaks at about two years, in line with Friedman's [1992] summary of dynamic responses for the US and other countries. Such dynamic responses have not previously been obtained in sticky price models, as stressed by Mankiw [2001] , and the response depends critically on the price adjustment pattern endogenously chosen by …rms. Second, it has been shown that speci…c factor markets and variable elasticity demand curves generate more persistent output e¤ects of monetary shocks because they moderate the size of price changes that …rms make. We investigate whether these results are sensitive to the incorporation of state-dependent pricing. We …nd that they can be: speci…c factor markets perversely work to lower persistence in the face of state-dependent pricing, while variable elasticity demand continues to raise it. 1 We thank our discussant Susanto Basu for his substantial patience as well as his useful comments and questions. We have also bene…tted from valuable comments by Alex Wolman and Pierre Sarte. 2 
quote from Taylor handbook chapter
The organization of the remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 provides a little background on the literatures related to this paper. Section 3 describes the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models that we employ in the paper. The next two sections of the paper provide our core …ndings. Section 4 evaluates whether modern quantitative state-dependent models have the four key implications highlighted by the early 1990s SDP literature. Section 5 evaluates the consequences of SDP for the two persistence-enhancing mechanisms stressed by some New Keynesian economists. The common …nding of sections 4 and 5 is that state-dependent pricing has a rich set of implications for the dynamics of macroeconomic models which di¤er substantially from those of time dependent models.
We are pleased to have contributed this work to the April 2004 Carnegie-Rochester conference in honor of Alan Stockman, "The Economics of Exchange Rates"and the resulting conference volume. Comparing our title and that of the conference, a reader may plausibly wonder if there has been some mistake and our paper has accidentally fallen into the wrong collection. But we do not think that Alan will think so, since he has long argued in various conference discussions that it is important to incorporate state-dependent pricing into open economy modeling. In the last decade, research on "the New Open Economy Macroeconomics" has explored the implications of sticky prices for the behavior of exchange rates. That literature has nearly exclusively concentrated on time-dependent pricing models. 3 . Our results suggest that the NOEM literature, by concentrating on time-dependent pricing models, may have missed some important dynamic implications of price-stickiness and reached inappropriate conclusions about the implications of structural features of models.
A little background
We begin by providing a quick overview of the two literatures on which we build. 4 
The early 1990s literature on state-dependent pricing
A decade ago, macroeconomists viewed dynamic models with state-dependent pricing (settings in which …rms choose the timing and magnitude of their price adjustments based on the state of the economy) as having very di¤erent implications from timedependent models (settings in which …rms choose the magnitude of price adjustment at exogenously speci…ed times). For example, the in ‡uential textbook of Blanchard and Fischer [1989] reviewed a number of state-dependent pricing models and stressed how di¤erent the conclusions from SDP models were from TDP models, particularly in terms of the e¤ects of monetary disturbances on real activity. Further contributions, published shortly after the textbook, increased the perceived discrepancy between time and state-dependent pricing models. Taken together, these developments through the early 1990s suggested the following ideas: (1) The steady-state pattern of price adjustment depends importantly on the nature of the demand and cost functions of the …rm (Sheshinki and Weiss [1977, 1983] ); (2) The dynamic e¤ect of money on output within state-dependent pricing models is dramatically di¤erent from that in time-dependent models, possibly involving complicated cyclical adjustment processes and nonlinear responses (Caplin and Leahy [1991] ); (3) The evolution of the price level is substantially a¤ected by the adjustment strategies of …rms interacting with heterogenous prices (Caballero and Engel [1993] ); and (4) Multiple equilibria can readily arise in state-dependent pricing models, due to complementarities in price-setting, even with the type of exogenous money stock rule that nearly always guarantees a unique equilibrium in time-dependent models (Ball and Romer [1991] ). Accordingly, our …rst objective in this paper is to evaluate whether these core ideas remain as features in dynamic general equilibrium analysis, with speci…c emphasis on the e¤ects of monetary shocks. Using a basic general equilibrium model, we …nd support for all of the core ideas from the early 1990s SDP literature. 5 
Recent work on output responses to monetary shocks
Within the last decade, there has been substantial research into the e¤ects of monetary shocks and monetary policy rules within macroeconomic models that incorporate time-dependent pricing, most frequently along the lines of Taylor [1980] or Calvo [1983] . By contrast, there has been relatively little research on these topics within state-dependent pricing models. Initially, this was because state-dependent pricing models were not operational: it was di¢ cult to solve them under general assumptions about the processes driving economic activity. But the Dotsey, King and Wolman [1999] state-dependent pricing model provides one laboratory where these questions can be addressed.
One major focus of the recent literature on time-dependent models has been a "search for persistence mechanisms", in response to Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan's [2000] provocative critique of Taylor-style pricing models. We look at two prominent ideas in the literature on New Keynesian macroeconomics: the idea that there are factor markets that are speci…c to individual …rms (Ball and Romer [1990] , Kimball [1995] and Rotemberg [1996] ) and the idea that …rms may face non-constant elasticity demand curves that are of a "smoothed o¤ kink" form (Ball and Romer [1990] and Kimball [1995] ). The basic idea is that each of these mechanisms should moderate the magnitude of price adjustments that a …rm would like to make, relative to those in a benchmark setting with ‡exible factors and a constant elasticity demand, thus making the price level response more sluggish and the nonneutrality of money more protracted.
In particular, we ask whether these New Keynesian mechanisms lead to increases in persistence that survive the introduction of state-dependent pricing. We …nd that there are very di¤erent conclusions for these two models. Within our state-dependent pricing framework, the introduction of local factor markets leads to more rapid price adjustment in the face of steady-state in ‡ation and also more rapid adjustment in response to monetary shocks. Accordingly, time-dependent models that stress this mechanism are implicitly relying on very large costs of price adjustment in order to generate persistence. The variable demand elasticity speci…cation works quite di¤er-ently and illustrates an important set of issues about state-dependent pricing models. First, in a steady state, this model produces more rapid adjustment -at given adjustment costs-than its constant elasticity counterpart. Second, in response to a monetary shock, this model produces slower adjustment initially than its constant elasticity counterpart. Taking these two e¤ects together, we …nd that the variable demand elasticity model enhances persistence in a state-dependent pricing environment.
DSGE models
We construct and study four models designed to be representative of much recent work in New Keynesian macroeconomics: production is linear in labor input; consumption and labor e¤ort are separable in utility, and aggregate demand is governed by the quantity theory of money. 6 Thus, the only sophisticated element is the statedependent pricing mechanism. While use of such simple models is limiting on some dimensions, it allows us to clearly illustrate the implications of state dependence for standard modeling. The four related models are as follows. Model I assumes that there is constant elasticity demand as in Dixit-Stiglitz [1977] and that there is a global labor market, two assumptions that allow for ready aggregation. 7 Model II allows for a variable demand elasticity, structured so that there is a "smoothed o¤"kink in the demand curve as suggested by Kimball [1995] . Models III and IV assume that there is a local labor market, a device used by authors such as Ball and Romer [1991] . 6 Relative to our work in Dotsey and King (2001), we therefore abstract from investment and capital formation; from variable utilization; and features of household preferences and constraints which rationalize separate choices of hours and employment or provide motivations for simultaneously varying consumption and hours. We also abstract from the structural features that give rise to money demand. 7 This is a standard set of assumptions in work on quantitative dynamic models beginning with King and Wolman [1996] and Yun [1996] :
The Demand Aggregator
Firms facing a declining demand elasticity will be less aggressive in pricing, as in the classic textbook discussion of a kinked demand curve. To develop a speci…c aggregator of the class suggested by Kimball [1995] , we consider a general expenditure minimization problem facing households,
where c is the total consumption aggregator implicitly de…ned by the demand aggregator D, which is an increasing concave function, and where P (i) is the nominal price charged by the ith …rm on the unit interval. For any such aggregator, the aggregate price level, P; is implicitly de…ned by
;where is the Lagrange multiplier on the constraint. For aggregators of the Kimball class, the …rst order condition can be solved to yield demand curves of the form
where is determined by the condition
Given the demand curve and the multiplier, the aggregate price level index is determined by
)di = 1. Our speci…c aggregator: We use a functional form for D that generates demand curves which are more elastic for …rms that adjust their price than for …rms whose relative price declines as a result of price …xity,
One nice property of this speci…cation is that the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator is a special case when = 0. The relative demand curves are given by
i.e., they are the sum of a constant elasticity demand augmented by a constant. The Lagrange multiplier is given by P = [
( 1)= . Conveniently, the aggregate price level index can be written as
so that it is the sum of a DS and linear aggregator. Figure 1 displays examples of the type of demand curves that can be generated with this aggregator. The benchmark case is a Dixit-Stiglitz speci…cation with a demand elasticity of 10 (this involves choosing = 0 and a variable elasticity demand curve, we choose the parameter so that the demand curve has elasticity 10 at c(i)=c = 1, with then controlling the shape of the curve at other points. 8 In the Figure, we use a value of = 1:02, which means that a 1.5% increase in price yields a 20% decrease in demand, which is intermediate between assumptions made by Kimball [1995] and Bergin and Feenstra [2000] . The marginal revenue schedules are plotted in panel B. The elasticity implications are shown in panel C: with = 1:02, a 20 percent decline in output means that the elasticity rises from 10 to 2.5, while a 10 percent rise in output means that the demand elasticity falls from 10 to 5. Finally, the pro…t implications at a marginal cost of :9 are shown in panel D.
Firms
We consider two labor market structures, one with global labor markets and the other where labor is tied to a speci…c …rm. In the latter case, we assume that …rms are small when it comes to assessing marginal cost, but large when it comes to pricing. 
Factor demand and marginal cost
Production is linear in labor, y(i) = an(i); where y(i) is the output of an individual …rm, a is the level of technology, and n(i) is hours worked at a particular …rm. Hence, real marginal cost, t ; is given by t = w t =a in the case of global factor markets or by t (i) = w t (i)=a in the case of speci…c factor markets.
Price setting
Dotsey, King and Wolman [1999] develop a model of dynamic pricing that can be readily integrated into a general equilibrium model. It also contains time and statedependent pricing speci…cations as special cases. Basic features of our approach are: (i) …rms are monopolistic competitors, facing demand for their product given by 2; (ii) within each period, some …rms will adjust their price and all adjusting …rms will choose the same nominal price P t ; (iii) the state of the economy includes a discrete distribution of …rms, with …rms of type j having last set their price j periods ago at the level P t j , so that we refer to j as the vintage of the price and denote the fractions of …rms with this price as jt (j = 1; 2; ::; J); and (iv) a fraction jt of vintage j …rms decides to adjust its price and a fraction 1 jt decides not to adjust its price (all vintage J …rms choose to adjust). 10 The fraction of …rms, after adjustment, which have a vintage j price is denoted ! jt and these fractions play an important role in our analysis because they serve as 8 As approaches 1 from above, the demand curve becomes increasingly more concave. 9 The local labor market is not quite the "yeoman farmer" setting, as we allow individual workers to insure against the consumption risks associated with individual market conditions. 10 Since all …rms are in one of these situations,
weights in various aggregation contexts. The total fraction of adjusting …rms (! 0t ) satis…es ! 0t = P J j=1 jt jt and fractions of …rms ! jt = (1 jt ) jt maintain the price that they previously set in period t j. Using these weights, for example, the perfect price level index is given by
Finally, the "beginning of period" fractions are mechanically related to the "end of period"fractions via j+1;t+1 = ! jt for j = 0; 1; :::; J 1.
If the adjustment fractions j are treated as …xed through time, then the model collapses to Levin [1991] , so that it contains Calvo [1983] and Taylor [1980] as special cases. In this interpretation, j plays two roles: it is the fraction of …rms given the opportunity to adjust within a period and it is also the probability of an individual …rm being allowed to adjust after j periods, conditional on not having adjusted for j 1 periods. Under state-dependent pricing we employ randomized …xed costs of adjustment to induce discrete adjustment by individual …rms, while allowing for an adjustment rate that responds smoothly to the aggregate state of the economy.
In both the time dependent and state-dependent settings, the …rm's optimal pricing decision can be described using a dynamic programming approach. For example, a …rm that last changed its price j periods ago, must choose between continuing with a …xed nominal price, which implies a relative price of p jt , (p jt = P t j =P t ); and paying a …xed cost of adjusting its price ( ). Each j-type …rm has a value function of the form
with
being, respectively, the values if the …rm does (v 0t ) or does not adjust (v jt ). In these functions and below, s t is a state vector that governs the evolution of the …rm's demand and costs and t+1 t is the ratio of future to current marginal utility, which is the appropriate discount factor. Real pro…ts are given by z(p jt ) = [p jt jt ]c jt : The dynamic program (4) implies that the optimal price satis…es an Euler equation that involves balancing pricing e¤ects on current and expected future pro…ts. That is, as part of an optimal plan, …rms that reset their price will choose a price that satis…es
Furthermore, for any given state of the economy there is a unique cuto¤ value of the price-adjustment cost for each …rm charging a relative price of p: All …rms that draw an adjustment cost lower than this cuto¤ will optimally choose to adjust their price. The endogenous adjustment fraction determined by the menu cost of the marginal …rm being just equal to the value gained, i.e.,
In the time dependent case, the …xed cost is either zero or in…nite depending on when the …rm last changed its price.
Iterating the Euler equation (5) forward, the optimal relative price, p t , can be related to current and expected future variables:
where (! j;t+;j =! 0;t ) = (1 j;t+j ) (1 j 1;t+j 1 ) ::: (1 1;t+1 ) is the probability of non-adjustment from t through t + j, and j;t+j is the elasticity of demand facing a …rm with relative output of c j;t+j =c t+j :
12 According to (6), the optimal relative price is a …xed markup over real marginal cost (p =
The Household
We want to have a household objective function that does not change radically when we consider local labor markets. Therefore, as in Dotsey and King (2001), we assume that there is a super household that chooses consumption and labor for each of its members, so that we avoid the potential complication of di¤erential wealth among individuals that would arise when workers are tied to speci…c …rms. The uni…ed household approach conveniently provides full income insurance. Speci…cally, the household solves
where c j and n j are the consumption and labor e¤ort of a household member working for a type j …rm; z jt is the pro…ts remitted to the household by a type j …rm. In this setting -full insurance and utility that is separable in labor e¤ort and consumption -all households consume the same amount, c t : The …rst order condition determining labor supply is
and, hence, 1 is Frisch labor supply elasticity. We further impose the money demand relationship M t =P t = c t : Ultimately, the level of nominal aggregate demand is governed by this relationship along with the central bank's supply of money.
Monetary Policy and Market Clearing
The model is closed by assuming that nominal money supply growth follows an autoregressive process,
where m is i.i.d. and normally distributed. Depending on the structure of factor markets, equilibrium involves either a wage rate or a vector of wage rates that clear the labor market while simultaneously implying utility maximization and cost minimization. Further, the aggregate price level is such that the money demand equals money supply, and individual …rm's prices are value maximizing.
13 13 There is no barrier to considering alternative monetary policy rules, such as interest rate rules, in our setting. However, we stick with the money supply rule for comparability with the results of other studies.
Evaluating predictions about SDP
We now evaluate whether the predictions of the early 1990s literature carry over to our dynamic general equilibrium setting. Throughout this section, we assume that the adjustment cost parameters are such that there is an approximately quadratic hazard function, in a sense made more speci…c below. In this section, we also restrict attention to the models in which there is a global labor market, so that there is a single real wage w t .
We choose preference parameter values that produce a low elasticity of marginal cost with respect to real output, assuming that = :25 and = :05 implying that the marginal cost elasticity is about . 30. 14 Many studies in the early 1990s literature explicitly or implicitly assumed low elasticities of marginal cost with respect to output. For example, in their analyses of real rigidity [1990] and multiple equilibria [1991], Ball and Romer assumed explicitly that utility was linear in consumption ( = 0) and that utility was close to linear in work ( was small). 15 
Adjustment timing and the age distribution of prices
The …rst two predictions comes from Sheshinski-Weiss [1977 , 1983 : (i) relatively small menu costs may lead …rms to adopt lengthy periods of price inactivity within an in ‡ationary steady-state; and (ii) the shape of the …rm's demand and cost conditions will be important for its frequency of price adjustment. Figure 2 displays the hazard rates at an annual 4 percent rate of in ‡ation for model I (Dixit-Stiglitz demand) and model II (Kimball kinked demand). 16 To begin, note that the chosen adjustment cost structure indeed leads to steady-state hazard functions that are roughly quadratic in the log relative price deviation, since log (P t ) log(P t j ) = j log( ); where is the steady-state in ‡ation rate. The …gure illustrates that the structure of demand and cost has a quantitatively important e¤ect on hazard rates. Firms choose to adjust more frequently if there is a kinked demand curve. The average age of a price in the global DS model is 3.9 quarters and it is 2.2 quarters in the global K model. The expected duration of price …xity is about 8 quarters in the global DS model and it is 4.8 quarters in the global K model. 17 14 Given that the household e¢ ciency condition is w t = c t n t ; given that consumption is equal to output; and given that labor is approximately equal to output, the elasticity is approximately + .. 15 Additional calibration information is as follows. First, we assume that there is a demand elasticity of 10 at the relative price of 1. With DS demand, this pins down " = 10. With the K demand, we assume that = 1:02 leading to the demand speci…cation displayed in Figure 1 . Choice of adjustment cost parameters is detailed in our working paper, Dotsey and King [2004] . 16 Both of the demand models that we study in this section satisfy a condition developed by Sheshinksi and Weiss, which is that p @z @p is decreasing in p. In their framework, this condition must be imposed if a higher rate of in ‡ation is to increase the frequency of price adjustment. 17 The two features are calculated as follows. First, the average age of price is just P J 1 j=0 j ! j , where we adopt a "start of period" age convention. Second, the expected duration of price …xity
The maximum adjustment cost is about 7.5% of production time in both of these economies, which is quite large (we call the fraction of total time devoted to price adjustment B and set it to B = :015: since the steady-state fraction of time that individuals devote to market work is n = :20, it follows that the adjustment cost is 7.5% of production work). However, because the highest adjustment cost is rarely paid, the average level of adjustment costs is only .42% of production time in model I (global-DS) and it is .86% of production time in model II (global-K), which are much smaller numbers. Another way of thinking about the magnitude of these costs is to measure the resources spent adjusting prices relative to sales, which is sometimes measured in the empirical literature on price adjustment costs: these are .37% and .78%, respectively, for the two economies. Figure 3 helps us understand why there is more rapid price adjustment in the economy with K-demand than with DS-demand: as a function of the …rm's relative price, pro…ts decline much more sharply when there are deviations of price from the p = 1 value that would be optimal in the absence of adjustment costs. The solid and dashed lines in each respective case are the value for all possible prices, while the stars and circles correspond to the prices that are actually chosen by the …rm in the steady state.
Dynamic e¤ects of monetary shocks
In the early 1990s literature on state-dependent pricing, Caplin and Leahy [1991] suggested that there would be strikingly di¤erent dynamics with endogenous timing of adjustment, in which the evolving distribution would play a critical role. In this section, we look at the dynamic response of output to an increase in the level of the money stock, which rises on impact by 1% and then gradually increases to 2% above its initial value. 18 
Model I: SDP dynamics with constant elasticity demand
The tendency for "front-loading" of price adjustments has been a much-discussed feature of sticky price models: if a …rm expects the price level to increase in the future and if the …rm expects to hold its nominal price …xed for a substantial time, then it will aggressively adjust its price in response to the expected future in ‡ation. In Figure 4 , it is clear that front-loading carries over to an SDP environment: the "reset price", which is the price set by adjusting …rms, increases by more than one-for-one
In this expression, the probability of a price "surviving" until age j is !j !0 = (1 1 )(1 2 ):::(1 j ) so that the expression is the sum of the survival probabilities times the additional length of price …xity (1) that derives from each survival. But since the survival probabilities sum to one, there is a particularly simple form of this expression. 18 That is, there is a value of = :5 in the money supply speci…cation.
with both the money stock and the price level. 19 The SDP environment also involves dynamics that are very di¤erent from those in time-dependent models of the Taylor-Calvo-Levin form. Notably, there are complicated oscillatory dynamics in the price level, output, labor, marginal cost and in ‡ation. In fact, a fair reaction to these dynamics is that they are very far from any estimates that derive from vector autoregressions or other methods of tracing out empirical responses to monetary changes. But just as with the dynamic responses derived analytically by Caplin-Leahy [1993] , which were also far from such empirical estimates, they illustrate that SDP models can deliver dramatically di¤erent dynamics for output and other variables than those in standard time-dependent models.
Contrasting TDP with SDP in the DS case
We now contrat the SDP model with a very speci…c TDP alternative, which we think is a natural benchmark: we use a TDP model that has the exactly same steady-state as the SDP model studied in Figure 4 , but we freeze the adjustment rates at their steady-state values Di¤erences between the dynamic responses, reported in Figure  ? ?,[bob -this ref appears as ??] then are attributable to whether adjustment rates vary in the face of a monetary shock. Relative to our SDP model, there are larger and more protracted output ‡uctations. There is a more sluggish price level, but no oscillatory dynamics.
Model II: SDP Dynamics with Kinked Demand
We next consider the e¤ect of the same monetary shock in a setting with a "smoothed o¤ kinked-demand curve" along the lines suggested by Kimball [1995] :. there are very di¤erent dynamic responses displayed in Figure 5 . Notably, in contrast to the DS model of the last subsection, the reset price is much less responsive under this speci…cation: there is no "front-loading" of price adjustments. There are two very intriguing features. First, the stimulation of real activity lasts for about 10 quarters, but is now followed by a period of real contraction, which lasts for a substantial period but does not undo the e¤ect of the initial stimulation. Second, while the real expansion of economic activity peaks after 4 quarters, the peak e¤ect on in ‡ation occurs much later.
These dynamics are not so evidentially at variance with various kinds of macroeconomic evidence. 20 First, in a critique of TDP sticky price models, Mankiw [2001] has argued that any macroeconomic model of the Phillips curve must produce a delayed surge in in ‡ation, that follows an initial real stimulation of economic activity. He uses 19 The reset price can increase by substantially more than the price level because only a fraction of the …rms are adjusting prices. 20 Anyone who has estimated vector autoregressions knows that there are many speci…cations that show monetary disturbances having an initial positive e¤ect on real economic activity and then a negative one (although speci…cation selection means that fewer of these are reported than estimated). this set of observations to critique standard New Keynesian sticky price models with Calvo price-setting. However, our simple state-dependent pricing model oucomes are reminiscent of Friedman's [1992] description of the dynamic e¤ects of a change in money growth and they are also broadly consistent with Mankiw's description. Speci…cally, in response to a monetary shock Friedman stressed that output responds before in ‡ation. He also suggested that the output response is delayed by about six to nine months and is distributed over time.
In model II, the response of in ‡ation is also distributed over time, but occurs with more of a lag -up to 12 to 18 months. With respect to output, we do not produce the real activity delays that Friedman describes, although output in our model does take two to three quarters before achieving its maximal response. Signi…cantly, however, the response of model in ‡ation is delayed and does not peak until about six quarters.
Contrasting SDP with TDP in the Kinked Demand Case
Looking at the panels of Figure 6 , we can again trace a comparison of the SDP and TDP variants. First, the price level increases at about the same rate in the TDP (solid line) and SDP (dashed line) models during the …rst year, but then it increases more rapidly in the SDP model, leading to a surge in in ‡ation during the second year. (The 'reset price'under TDP is marked with a '*', while that under SDP is marked with an 'o'). Second, the oscillatory dynamics are attributable to changes in the rate of adjustment, since they are not present in the TDP variant.
Understanding the incentives for adjustment
What are the incentives for price adjustment in the dynamic models? At one level, the answer is easy: there is a greater rate of adjustment if there is a greater value to adjusting. However, the determinants of v 0t v jt are complicated, within and across the DS and K-demand models. Accordingly, we start here by focusing directly on a measure of one-period pro…t, which is revealing about the di¤erence in adjustment incentives. We then discuss aspects of a dynamic decomposition for the K-demand case. Finally, we consider the evolution of the price level once again, displaying the importance of adjustment timing quantitatively.
Contrasting adjustment incentives: a static perspective To begin, we note that a rise in output and an associated increase in marginal cost is an important feature of Figure 5 . We therefore start by looking at a measure of the static gain to price adjustment in the face of a 1% rise in real marginal cost, de…ned as ) is the level of pro…t under fully ‡exible prices.
We begin by graphing this measure as the dashed line in Figure 7 for the Kdemand model. First, the price p is just above one because the …rm faces the rapidly declining pro…t illustrated in Figure 3 and thus a …rm which is free to raise its price will not do so by very much in the face of the increase in marginal cost. Second, given the desirability of a small adjustment, it is intuitive that there is also a small loss of maintaining price p = 1, the price that would be optimal in the absence of the rise in marginal cost. Hence, in the kinked demand world, a …rm with p = 1 also has only a small incentive to pay a …xed cost to adjust its price. However, should its price deviate signi…cantly from p=1, then the …rm facing a kinked demand has a large incentive to adjust: this was the feature that led to more rapid steady-state adjustment under K-demand in Figure 2 above.
We also …nd the …gure helpful in thinking about why there are larger incentives for price adjustment in response to a rise in marginal cost with DS-demand rather than K-demand: the DS model leads to larger desired price adjustments and therefore larger gains to adjustment near p = 1. But it leads to relatively smaller e¤ects with large departures from p = 1, so that it is also compatible with more extended stickiness in the steady state.
A dynamic perspective on the adjustment with kinked demand The adjustment rate for a …rm of vintage j is implicitly given by ( jt )w 0t = v 0t v jt . Accordingly, we can take a …rst order approximation to this expression and deduce that
so that it is possible to explore the e¤ects of the price level on adjustment incentives, holding …xed other factors. Speci…cally, we take the equilibrium solution for log(p jt ) log(p j ) and then construct a synthetic series e jt j using the equation above. Given these synthetic series, we can also construct a synthetic series for the vintages, e ! jt ! j , which is a dynamic simulation of sorts since it obeys the dynamic equations
That is, the synthetic series for e ! jt is constructed solely on the basis of variations in the synthetic adjustment rates fe jt g j;t , so that it too involves only the e¤ects of p jt . We have undertaken this decomposition and have found that e¤ects of p jt are dominant on jt -in the sense of high R 2 -except for those …rms which just adjusted, with this exception seeming plausible on the basis of our prior analysis of static pro…t gain (as illustrated in Figure 7 ).[That is because the initial price response is so small, there is not much change in 1t do to prices and other factors explain a greater proportion of the change in …rst bin adjusters] The price e¤ects capture variations in vintage fractions (! jt ) virtually completely. 21 The evolution of the price level once again Caballero and Engel [1993] emphasized that the behavior of the price level would be in ‡uenced by the interaction of the evolving distribution of prices and the evolving probability that individual price adjustments would take place. To explore this channel within our model, we consider the movement of a linear aggregate of the price level, P t = P J 1 j=0 ! jt P jt : This price level can be decomposed directly into a part P J 1 j=0 ! j P jt that is the e¤ect of price stickiness when steady-state weights are maintained and an additional component, P J 1 j=0 (! jt ! j )P jt that derives from the interaction of evolving adjustment rates and past prices. That is, a useful decomposition of the price level suggested by this model is
In our framework, we want to calculate a linear decomposition that captures the elements highlighted by (7) . To develop such a linear decomposition, we begin by noting that the linear aggregate is related to the perfect (exact, nonlinear) price index (3) according to
. Di¤erentiating this expression, we …nd that we can express the motion of the linear aggregate as follows,
21 See our working paper, Figures X and Y, for these simulations.The adjustment rate for a …rm of vintage j is implicitly given by ( jt )w 0t = v 0t v jt , which we can write as
Accordingly, it is more generally possible to link variations in adjustment rates to three factors: pro…ts (z jt ); a measure of the urgency of adjustment (v 0;t E t [ t+1 t v 0;t+1 ]); and an "option value" of adjustment term that involves future adjustment costs. Further, the e¤ects of pro…tability can be decomposed into consequences of relative price variations; marginal cost variations; and aggregate demand variations. We have undertaken some exploration of the analytics and quantitative performance of such measures in our model, but these experiments are not reported in the working paper because of the dominance of the e¤ect of the price level on relative prices.
i.e., as the sum of a term that captures the e¤ect of nominal price adjustments at …xed weights and a term that captures the e¤ects of changes in adjustment probabilities. Applying this decomposition to the K-demand model, we produce Figure 8 .
The top panel of this Figure shows that the exact price level (3) and the linear aggregator are indistinguishable to the eye in this economy, but that there is an important di¤erence between these and the …xed hazard part of the price level, which is
)]g. Interestingly, this di¤erence is miniscule during the …rst few quarters after the monetary shock hits, but it becomes important later on, rising with in ‡ation, as the second panel shows. The background to this panel is Figure 2 , which shows that 22% of the …rms in the economy are adjusting each period in steady-state. The second panel of Figure shows that this fraction rises by about 3% during the second year after the shock, which is when in ‡ation peaks (adjustment rates here are measured as a deviation from the steady-state level).
On the basis of this analysis, we conclude that this case has strong e¤ects of the type identi…ed by Caballero and Engel [1993] : the interaction of the nearly quadratic hazard, sticky nominal prices, and the price level is at the heart of understanding the dynamics of in ‡ation. Concretely, the delayed response in in ‡ation shown in Figure  5 arises because there is initially little movement in the price level, so that …rms have little incentive to pay to adjust prices. However, as the price level continues to rise, more …rms have this incentive and their collective action produces a further rise in the price level which additionally reinforces the extent of adjustment.
Multiplicity and nonexistence
Ball and Romer [1991] highlight the possibility of multiple equilibria in basic SDP models, stressing that changes in the price level can alter the privately optimal pattern of price adjustment for …rms. In our DSGE model, we have found that there apparently is a substantial part of the parameter space in which there are both multiplicity and nonexistence according to the criteria of Blanchard and Kahn [1980] . That we …nd these regions in the K-demand case is perhaps not too surprising, given the central role that the price level played in triggering adjustment in the prior section.
In Figure 9 , for the K-demand model, we calculate the number of stable eigenvalues of the dynamic model at each point in a grid of the adjustment cost parameter B -which is the largest value that the adjustment cost can be -and the labor utility parameter . If there is a '*'in the Figure, then this means that there is a unique, stable rational expectations solution: the number of stable eigenvalues is equal to the number of predetermined variables. Since we are studying B = :015 and = :05 in the Figures above, we start by noting that there is a '*'in that location. We also note that there is a region around this point in which there is uniqueness, but that it is close to the border with a region of nonexistence. At other points in the …gure, there are fewer stable eigenvalues than predetermined variables, which implies nonexistence according to Blanchard-Khan, so that we put an 'o'in that location. Finally, there are points in which there are more stable eigenvalues than predetermined variables, which implies multiplicity (nonuniqueness) according to Blanchard-Khan, so that we put a ' 'in that location. John and Wolman [2004] have begun the important work of exploring the conditions under which dynamic multiple equilibria occur in SDP models, together with providing economic interpretation about these …ndings. Their analysis suggests that this is a complex and subtle topic.
It is important to stress that nonexistence and nonuniqueness do not always arise. For one example, if we were to produce a version of this …gure for the comparable TDP model, then all points would be a unique equilibrium: this buttresses the BallRomer idea that multiplicity is related to state dependence. For another, a version of this …gure for the DS model examined above (demand elasticity =10) would also lead to uniqueness for all parameter values in this grid. Finally, in exploring both K and DS models with a global labor market, a higher elasticity of marginal cost to output (over one) and the adjustment cost distribution similar to that used in DKW [1999] , we also did not …nd nonexistence or nonuniqueness. But in some investigations, nonexistence and nonuniqueness can arise for precisely the parameter values that interest a researcher. For example, we would like to look at adjustment cost speci…cations with a smaller value of B than B = :015, so as to reduce the extent of steady-state stickiness. But we cannot, because this moves us out of the region of solvability. Moreover, in exploring SDP model dynamics in the current investigation, we have encountered -particularly in models with local factor markets -many cases in which there are apparently multiple equilibria or there is nonexistence. In our experience, Figure 9 is representative in that it suggests that there is indeed a complicated relationship, since the relevant regions are discontinuous.
Speci…c factors and persistence
An important line of macroeconomic research has explored the implications of the various sticky-price model features for the timepaths of real and nominal variables, with one particular topic being the persistence of real e¤ects in the wake of Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan [2000] . Work by Kimball [1995] and Rotemberg [1996] viewed each …rm as having a pool of workers to draw from as opposed to buying labor in a competitive market. Hence, even if the …rm purchased labor competitively, it knew that an increase (decrease) in its demand would raise (lower) the wage rate and it would take this factor into account in pricing its product. The intuition behind this result is as follows. An increase in the current price cuts demand, which lowers marginal cost when factors are speci…c. In turn, the lower marginal cost makes it e¢ cient to price less aggressively. For this reason, Kimball [1995] and Rotemberg [1996] suggested that there would be increased price sluggishness and persistence if one switches from a global to local view of factor markets. They also discuss the fact that in setting a low price, the …rm must balance the fact that there will be high demand in the future and that this output must be produced at high cost, but they conclude that the overall e¤ect is to make …rms price less aggressively and to increase price level sluggishness.
We use di¤erent parameter values to explore this idea. First, we assume that there is a higher elasticity of marginal cost with respect to output and in particular that it is about 1.5 (we do this by assuming = 1 and = :5). Second, since Kimball and Rotemberg both used Calvo-like models, we assume that there is an adjustment cost structure that makes the global-DS version into an "approximate Calvo"model within the steady-state, having an adjustment hazard of about .2 for eight quarters before complete adjustment occurs. 22 
The promise
We begin by illustrating the promise of the speci…c factors mechanism, calculating the output impulse reponses for an approximate Calvo model and displaying it in Figure ? ?.
[MD: what do we really do?] The dramatic promise of speci…c factors appears in the output responses for models I-IV, with speci…c factors alone (model III) producing virtually the same persistence as the variable elasticity of demand spec…cation (II). 23 The combination of the two New Keynesian mechanism, as oirginally suggested by Kimball, yields a great deal of persistence.
Approximate Calvo
We want to explore the e¤ects of state dependence within a battery of models that have an approximate Calvo form, i.e., a steady-state hazard that is roughly constant for a number of periods. Accordingly, we select the parameters of our cost function so that there is a ‡at hazard for the DS-global setting for 8 quarters, which is a "truncated Calvo" steady state. The necessary cost function, ( ), is one that is fairly ‡at until = :2 then rises very sharply to close to the maximum cost. Faced with this adjustment cost, …rms with a range of di¤erent values of (v 0 v j )=w 0 will all choose = :2. When (v 0 v j )=w 0 B = :015, then all …rms will choose to adjust ( = 1).
With this cost structure in hand, we can explore the e¤ect of changing the structure of demand and the e¤ect of localizing factors on hazard rates and vintage fractions, as we did previously for the alternative cost speci…cation.. FRigure ?? displays the results, revealing some worth highlighting. First, as suggested above, the …gure displays "approximate Calvo" form of adjustment: the optimal hazard is about .2 if it is not one. Second, in the global factor market setting, as above, the shift from DS-demand to K-demand lowers the number of periods over which there is incomplete adjustment by …rms, cutting it from 8 in the DS case to 4 in the K-demand case. Third, for both of the local market cases, the results are dramatic: moving from global to local markets cuts the interval of partial adjustment to just one period.. To understand this, we return to the original intuition from Kimball [1995] and Rotemberg [1996] : with a …xed hazard, a …rm sets its price relatively less aggressively than under global markets because it wants to take advantage of low current marginal cost, which occurs when price is raised above the benchmark value of one. In doing so, as discussed above, it must balance the fact that there will be high demand in the future and that this output must be produced at high cost. But these future periods of low pro…ts -resulting from high demand and high cost occurring together -can be avoided through a payment of an adjustment cost, so that the …rm makes aggressive use of this option in both local market settings. In fact, under our the current parameterization, it keeps prices …xed for only two periods (including the initial period of price adjustment).
This dramatic implication of very short intervals of price …xity for the DS-local and K-local models could be altered by assuming larger values of the maximum price adjustment cost (which is here set equal to .015). But, then, the conclusion would be that models with local factor markets require substantially higher adjustment costs to obtain a speci…ed pattern of "near Calvo"adjustment. In fact, in order to produce price …xity of four periods in the DS case we must ramp up adjustment costs so that 5.85% of labor e¤ort is devoted to price changes at a cost of 5.5% of sales. Thus, a TDP pricing model with local labor markets and four vintages of …rms is ignoring tremendous incentives that …rms have for adjusting their price. This level of menu costs strikes us as implausible.
Consequences of endogenous adjustment
To explore the implications of moving from global to local (speci…c) factor markets, we now explore how the dynamics are altered as this feature of the model is altered, holding the cost of adjustment structure discussed above. Figure 10 displays the e¤ect of moving from a global to local market under state-dependent pricing with the DS-demand structure, which indicates that the persistence gain suggested by Figure  ? ? turns into a persistence loss under state-dependent pricing. Figure 13 displays the e¤ect of moving from a global to local market under state-dependent pricing with the K-demand structure, which indicates that the persistence gain suggested by Figure  ? ? also turns into a persistence loss under state-dependent pricing.
Looking across this pair of …gures, it is clear that there is more persistence with model IV (K-local) than with model III (DS-local). However, more importantly, this pair of …gures illustrates a principal: economic mechanisms that have one set of consequences under time-dependent pricing (as in Figures ?? and ?? ) can have a very di¤erent set of consequences under state-dependent pricing (as in Figure 10 and 13) because the mechanisms alter the incentives that agents have to adjust the timing of their price changes.
The e¤ect of K-demand on dynamics once again
It is important to stress that persistence is not necessarily reduced when a model feature lowers the number of periods of price-…xity in the steady-state. As background, Figure ? ? shows that the number of periods of price-…xity is roughly halved when DS-demand is replaced by K-demand. Figure ? ? shows the e¤ects of moving from DS-demand to K-demand on the dynamic response to a monetary shock (in this diagram, a solid line refers to the K-demand model and a dashed line refers to the DS model). Despite the smaller number of price vintages, the K-demand model continues to have the important implication discussed above: the K-demand makes …rms less aggressive on the pricing front, converting the more than 2% change in the reset price on impact to about a .8% change in the reset price on impact. That is, even though the current framework is one with a higher elasticity of marginal cost to output and a di¤erent structure of adjustment costs, the price level still is initially more sluggish than under DS-demand, which brings about both a larger real output response and a more persistent one.
In terms of the dynamics of the in ‡ation rate, the K-demand model also leads to a peak in ‡ation rate that lags the output peak, although it does so only by one or two quarters in this case. However, the change in the adjustment cost function from one involving a nearly quadratic hazard to one involving a nearly constant hazard does mean that there is a quite di¤erent decomposition of the sources of variations in the price level. If we were to reproduce Figure 8 for the current adjustment cost structure, then we would …nd that there was only a miniscule di¤erence between the various price level measures and a very small change in the fraction of …rms altering the timing of their price adjustment in the face of the monetary shock.
Summary and conclusions
What are the implications of state-dependent pricing models for dynamic macroeconomic modeling?. In this paper, we showed that these are rich and varied, working within a battery of quantitative dynamic general equilibrium models.
We began by investigating whether some of the results of the 1990s literature on state-dependent pricing carried over to our models, which are constructed along the lines proposed by Dotsey, King and Wolman [1999] . This earlier literature reached the general conclusion that SDP models were very di¤erent from the more commonly employed time-dependent pricing models (TDP models). More speci…cally, it suggested the following ideas: (1) the steady-state pattern of price adjustment depends importantly on the nature of the demand and cost functions of the …rm; (2) the dynamic e¤ect of money on output within state-dependent pricing models is dramatically di¤erent from that in time-dependent models, possibly involving complicated cyclical adjustment processes and nonlinear responses; (3) the evolution of the price level is substantially a¤ected by the adjustment strategies of …rms interacting with heterogenous prices; and (4) multiple equilibria can readily arise in state-dependent pricing models, due to complementarities in price-setting, even with the type of exogenous money stock rule that nearly always guarantees a unique equilibrium in a time-dependent models. Working with assumptions characteristic of that literature, speci…cally that there is a low elasticity of marginal cost with respect to output and that there is a hazard function which rises quadratically in a measure of price gaps, we found support for all of these ideas, except that our use of linear approximation methods precluded studying nonlinear dynamics. Exploring the dynamic response of output and in ‡ation to monetary shocks in a model with a "smoothed o¤ kinked demand curve", we unexpectedly found a pattern of output and in ‡ation dynamics that has been suggested to be inconsistent with sticky price models: withe output peaking after four quarters, and in ‡ation peaking nearly a year later.
In evaluating the implications of state-dependent pricing for dynamic macroeconomic models, we also considered issues related to ongoing research into model features that can lead to larger persistence of output responses to monetary shocks. Working with an adjustment cost structure that was designed to produce a relatively ‡at hazard function over eight quarters in the reference case of a constant elasticity demand curve and a global labor market, we found that two model modi…cations -a variable demand elasticity and a local labor market -led to sharply reduced intervals of stickiness. The kinked demand curve model had a ‡at hazard over 4 quarters rather than 8; the local labor market models had only one period of incomplete price adjustment. For this reason, it turned out that the local labor market friction lowered persistence under SDP rather than raising persistence as it does under TDP. However, the result for the kinked demand curve was that there was larger persistence (relative to constant elasticity demand) even though the steady-state duration of price …xity was smaller under kinked rather than constant elasticity demand. Taken together, these examples show that state-dependent pricing may alter the conclusions that a researcher would draw about the e¤ect of structural elements of a model.
In closing their 1989 discussion of state-dependent pricing and time-dependent pricing, Blanchard and Fischer considered the types of economic exchanges that might be best modeled using either approach, but they could only summarize a few empirical studies about price adjustment dynamics (notably Cecchetti [1986] and Kashyap [1995] ). 2425 Recent work by Bils and Klenow [2003] and Klenow and Krystov [2003] is providing valuable new information about the behavior of consumer goods prices in the U.S., both in terms of the timing and magnitude of adjustments, and many studies are underway for other countries. 26 It is clear from this ongoing work that the average duration of price …xity di¤ers substantially across industries and that there are important period-to-period changes in the fractions of goods whose prices are changed. It is also clear that aspects of this work raise challenges for existing models of price adjustment, both time-dependent and state-dependent. Learning further about the general implications of these pricing models for macroeconomic dynamics, as we have here, will be a central component of the important project of taking SDP models to data. 26 http , notably the cooperative project being sponsored by the European Central Bank. 
